UIdaho Law

Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law
Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs

5-24-2016

State v. Conner Appellant's Brief Dckt. 43438

Follow this and additional works at: https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/
idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs
Recommended Citation
"State v. Conner Appellant's Brief Dckt. 43438" (2016). Idaho Supreme Court Records & Briefs. 6053.
https://digitalcommons.law.uidaho.edu/idaho_supreme_court_record_briefs/6053

This Court Document is brought to you for free and open access by Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. It has been accepted for inclusion in Idaho
Supreme Court Records & Briefs by an authorized administrator of Digital Commons @ UIdaho Law. For more information, please contact
annablaine@uidaho.edu.

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO
STATE OF IDAHO,

)
)
Plaintiff/Respondent,
)
)
vs.
)
)
ANTHONY WAYNE CONNER,
)
)
Defendant/Appellant.
)
__________________________________ )
)

S.Ct. Docket No. 43438
Ada Co. CR-FE-2014-15131

__________________________________
OPENING BRIEF OF APPELLANT
__________________________________
Appeal from the District Court of the Fourth Judicial District
of the State of Idaho In and For the County of Ada
__________________________________
HONORABLE RICHARD D. GREENWOOD
District Judge
__________________________________
Dennis Benjamin
ISB 4199
NEVIN, BENJAMIN, McKAY
& BARTLETT LLP
P.O. Box 2772
Boise, ID 83701
(208) 343-1000

Lawrence Wasden
IDAHO ATTORNEY GENERAL
Criminal Law Division
Russell J. Spencer, Deputy
P.O. Box 83720
Boise, ID 83720-0010
(208) 334-2400

Attorneys for Appellant

Attorneys for Respondent

TABLE OF CONTENTS
I.

Table of Authorities ........................................................................................... ii

II.

Statement of the Case ........................................................................................ 1
A.

Nature of the case .................................................................................... 1

B.

Trial proceedings ...................................................................................... 1

III.

Issues Presented on Appeal .............................................................................. 11

IV.

Argument........................................................................................................... 11
A.

B.

V.

The district court abused its discretion by excluding Otis Conner’s
statement that he had injured himself as inadmissible hearsay. It was
admissible under the residue hearsay exception .................................. 11
1.

Facts pertaining to argument ..................................................... 12

2.

The court’s ruling......................................................................... 13

3.

Why relief should be granted ...................................................... 14

Alternatively, the district court committed fundamental error by
violating Mr. Conner’s constitutional right to present evidence when it
excluded Otis Conner’s statements about his injury ............................ 20
1.

One of Mr. Conner’s unwaived constitutional rights was
violated ......................................................................................... 20

2.

The error plainly exists and the failure to object on this basis
was not a tactical decision ........................................................... 25

3.

The error was not harmless ........................................................ 25

Conclusion

...................................................................................................... 27

i

TABLE OF AUTHORITIES
FEDERAL CASES
Chambers v. Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284 (1973) ...................................................... 20, 21
Dallago v. United States, 427 F.2d 546 (D.C.Cir. 1969) ............................................. 26
Gibson v. Clanon, 633 F.2d 851 (9th Cir. 1980) ......................................................... 25
Huff v. White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d 286 (7th Cir. 1979) ........................................... 17
Rhoden v. Rowland, 172 F.3d 633 (9th Cir.1999) ...................................................... 25
Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988) ........................................................................ 20
U.S. v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303 (1998) .......................................................................... 21
United States v. Caruto, 532 F.3d 822 (9th Cir. 2008) ............................................... 25
United States v. Sandoval-Gonzalez, 642 F.3d 717 (9th Cir. 2011) ........................... 25
United States v. Varoudakis, 233 F.3d 113 (1st Cir. 2000) ........................................ 25
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14 (1967) .................................................................... 21
STATE CASES
Allen v. United States, 837 A.2d 917 (D.C. 2003) ....................................................... 26
State v. Harris, 132 Idaho 843, 979 P.2d 1201 (1999) ................................................ 20
State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 768 P.2d 1331 (1989) ............................................... 14
State v. Peite, 122 Idaho at 813, 839 P.2d at 1227 ............................................... 21, 22
State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520, 81 P.3d 1230 (2003) ........................................ 21, 22, 24
State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 245 P.3d 961 (2010) ........................................ 19, 20, 25
State v. Russo, 157 Idaho 299, 336 P.3d 232 (2014) ................................................... 22
State v. Thomas, 157 Idaho 916, 342 P.3d 628 (2015).................................... 20, 23, 24

ii

State v. Zimmerman, 121 Idaho 971, 829 P.2d 861 (1992) ........................................ 14
STATE STATUTES
Idaho Rule of Evidence 401 ......................................................................................... 22
Idaho Rule of Evidence 803 ............................................................................. 14, 15, 18
Idaho Rule of Evidence 804 ............................................................................. 14, 15, 18
OTHER
2 McCormick On Evid. § 324 (7th ed.), citing the Adv. Comm. Note, Fed. R. Evid.
803(24) ............................................................................................................... 15
Adv. Comm. Note, Fed. R. Evid. 803(24) .............................................................. 14, 15
Fed. Rules of Evidence (Treatise) Rule 807 (3d ed.) ................................................... 17
Hearsay Handbook 4th .......................................................................................... 15, 16

iii

II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the case
Anthony “Tony” Conner testified that he came home after having dinner out

with his girlfriend, stepdaughter and grand-stepdaughter to find that his 87-yearold father, Otis, had fallen off a 10-foot ladder while trying to retrieve items in a
garage attic storage area, hit his head on the concrete floor or steps, and died. The
coroner’s office originally determined the cause of death to be accidental. The state
later charged Tony with first-degree murder along with grand theft, forgery and
destruction of evidence charges theorizing that he hit his father on the head with a
hammer in the living room, dragged the body to the garage and staged the ladder
accident in order to gain money from his father. R 12-13. The jury, after
deliberating four days, found Tony guilty of second-degree murder and destroying
evidence and could not reach a verdict on the theft-related charges. The convictions
should be vacated because the district court erred by excluding Otis Conner’s
statement made a week before his death that he had fallen down in the living room
and had hurt his head causing bleeding.
B.

Trial proceedings
Otis Conner, 87, lived with his 62-year-old son, Anthony “Tony” Conner, at

Tony’s home in Meridian, Idaho. Tony testified that on January 2, 2013, at about
8:45 p.m., he arrived home from having dinner out with his stepdaughter, grandstepdaughter, and girlfriend. T pg. 2487, ln. 21 - pg. 2490, ln. 25. He noticed the
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garage lights were on, but the lights inside the house were not. This meant that his
father was in the garage. He parked in the driveway instead of opening the garage
door because he did not want to disturb whatever Otis was doing and also to not let
in a blast of cold air. T pg. 2491, ln. 1-25. Entering through the front door, Tony
noticed the dog needed to go outside. He let the dog out the back door and waited
for it to return. He then went into the garage and saw his father lying on the
ground, in a pool of blood, having fallen off a ladder. T pg. 2492, ln. 1 - pg. 2493, ln.
25. The access hatch to the garage attic was open. Exhibits 20-21. Tony bent down
to see if Otis was alive, but didn’t touch him because he didn’t know how to perform
CPR and it was apparent that Otis was dead. Instead, he called 911. The
paramedics arrived in just two minutes. Tony opened the garage door when he
heard them coming and they rushed inside and starting tending to Otis. The police
arrived shortly afterwards. Tony answered all the questions asked of him by the
police. T pg. 2494, ln. 1 - pg. 2497, ln. 24. Someone from the coroner’s office
arrived. Tony had them come into the house where it was warm to finish asking
their questions and to fill out their paperwork. The firefighters offered to clean up
all the blood in the garage and they came inside to gather cleaning supplies. T pg.
2498, ln. 2 - pg. 2500, ln. 18. Someone, possibly firefighter-paramedic Tom Chance,
who was tending to Otis, estimated that he had died about an hour and 45 minutes
earlier, or between 7:45 and 8:00, when Tony was at dinner. T pg. 2500, ln. 19 - pg.
2501, ln. 120.
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Randy Conner, another of Otis’s sons, said he had warned Otis not to get up
on the ladder. During the summer of 2012, Doug saw Otis up on the ladder in the
garage working on the springs of the overhead door. “And I said, ‘Dad, you
shouldn’t be up on the ladder. You shouldn’t be wrestling with the garage door. If
you need help with heavy stuff, you know, let one of us know.’” T pg. 2021, ln. 1-25.
Otis’s grandson, Brandon Conner, said Otis was set in his ways and would try to do
chores around the house which were beyond his capacity. T pg. 2330, ln. 2-14.
The grandson had seen his grandfather fall several times. T pg. 2332, ln. 2-3.
He also never heard Tony speak harshly to Otis. T pg. 2331, ln. 20-24. A neighbor,
Earl McCamic, said that Otis was always working in the house, yard, or in the
garage. On one occasion in the fall of 2012, he and his wife saw Otis standing in the
driveway and just fall over. T pg. 2154, ln. 8 - pg. 2156, ln. 2. Maryanne McCamic,
who was a nurse, said Otis’s gait was unsteady and he was very unstable on his
feet. “[H]e said on several occasions that he’d been falling quite a bit.” She saw
“lots of marks” on his face and forehead. T pg. 2164, ln. 2-16. She worried about
Otis because “[h]e always pushed the envelope” by driving, despite his bad vision,
and mowing the yard every week. Once she saw Otis with a large gash on his
forehead and cheek. He told her that he had fallen down and hit his head on a piece
of furniture. He didn’t want to go to the ER, so he just bandaged it himself. T 2164,
ln. 17 - pg. 2166, ln. 20.
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Tony testified that in 2012, Otis began to take falls. He fell into the bushes
by the mailbox, he fell in the living room on his way to his favorite chair, he fell
another time at the mailbox, and a fourth time in front of brother Randy’s house. T
pg. 2403, ln. 4 - pg. 2406, ln. 19. A few days before Otis’s death, on December 26,
2012, he fell again when Tony was away from home. When Tony returned, he saw
Otis had a large gauze bandage on his head and was cleaning the living room rug.
Otis looked peaked and was lethargic, so Tony asked if he needed to see a doctor.
Otis replied, “I don’t need no damned doctor.” Tony did not see any bloodstains on
the floor because Otis had moved his area rug over the top. The next day, however,
he returned home after work to find Otis running a SpotBot cleaning machine over
the rug. There were two large blood spots and the heat register was also bloody.
The gauze bandage from the day before had been replaced with a larger bandage.
Otis’s demeanor was good and he said he had just come back from Walmart with
some carpet cleaner and he was going to take care of it. The SpotBot pumped a
solution into the carpet to soak and soften the stain which had the effect of making
the treated stain larger than before. T pg. 2454, ln. 12 - pg. 2458, ln. 14. Otis tried
to pry up the heat register but couldn’t get his fingers underneath the edge, so Tony
went to the garage and grabbed a claw hammer. Tony pried the register up with
the claws of the hammer, took the register to the kitchen sink and washed the blood
off of it. Otis replaced the register and Tony put the hammer back in the toolbox. T
pg. 2458, ln. 15 - pg. 2460, ln. 12; pg. 2464, ln. 3 - pg. 2466, ln. 3. They gave up on
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cleaning the carpet, after concluding that it would just need to be replaced. T pg.
2467, ln. 21. Otis had Tony write out a check on his account for the replacement
cost of the carpet. T pg. 2468, ln. 12-20.
The next weekend, Kelly and Paula Riggs, family friends, stopped by the
house to drop off a present for Tony. Kelly went to the door and Otis answered.
Kelly noticed that Otis had a larger-sized bandage on his forehead, high on the
right side close to the hairline. T pg. 2307, ln. 8 - pg. 2309, ln. 9. Paula came in and
also saw “a very large bandage on his head.” T pg. 2319, ln. 6-11.
Paramedic Chance was the first on the scene in response to Tony’s January 2,
2012, 911 call. He saw Otis lying supine on the floor with a fallen ladder down by
his legs. There was a lot of blood on the floor. Otis was in rigor mortis and there
was a lot of trauma to the back of his head. The paramedic quickly determined that
Otis was dead. T pg. 578, ln. 3 - pg. 580, ln. 18. Before that occurred, however,
another firefighter moved the ladder to permit easier access to Otis, in case life
saving measures were needed. T pg. 581, ln. 4-16.
Tony told the paramedic that he had last seen Otis at about 3:00 p.m. T pg.
579, ln. 19-22. An investigator from the coroner’s office testified that, while “[t]here
is no way to know exactly what time he passed away,” he estimated the time of
death at 4:00 p.m. T pg. 572, ln. 4-6. Paramedic Chance testified that he only
pronounced Otis dead and that firefighters do not estimate time of death. T pg.
2666, ln. 20 - pg. 2667, ln. 7.
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The police at first classified the incident as an “unattended death,” as
opposed to a homicide. T pg. 658, ln. 7-23. The same is true of the coroner’s office,
which also concluded that Otis’s death was accidental. T pg. 1469, ln. 21-25. Dr.
Glen Groben did a body examination of Otis, but did not conduct a full autopsy or a
brain autopsy. T pg. 1445, ln. 3-6; pg. 141, ln. 2-7. He found two injuries to the
back of Otis’s head and a wound on his left index finger. T pg. 1448, ln. 8-16. After
that examination, Dr. Groben concluded “that Otis had fallen off the ladder, gotten
up, stumbled over, and then fell on the stairs and hit his head again[.]” T pg. 1477,
ln. 10-15. Later, however, he concluded that the death was a homicide, in part
because the wounds were consistent with having been caused by a blow from the
claw of a hammer and that such a hammer was found in a tool box in the garage
during the execution of a search warrant on January 12, 2013. T pg. 686, ln. 6-22;
pg. 1451, ln. 2 - pg 1453, ln. 3. That hammer had a small amount of Otis’s blood,
but not hair or skin, between the claws. T pg. 1073, ln. 10-24. It could not be
determined how long that bit of dried blood had been on the hammer. T pg. 1228,
ln. 17-23.
Detective Craig Fawley testified that the floor of the laundry room between
the kitchen and garage was sprayed with a “chemical that indicates the presence of
protein similar with blood,” and the treatment appeared to reveal drag marks. T
pg. 767, ln. 1-21; pg. 771, ln. 12-25. Natalie Hernandez, a forensic scientist,
testified that she was the one who sprayed that chemical, “LCV” (Leuco Crystal
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Violet), in the house. T pg. 909, ln. 20-25. However, two state witnesses admitted
LCV will react to substances other than blood, including common household
cleaners. T pg. 915, ln. 2-17; pg. 885, ln. 1-17.
Detective Tara Smith noticed blood stains on the rug and carpet during the
execution of the search warrant. T pg. 813, ln. 1-8. These are shown on Exhibits
31-37; 42-45. She also found the SpotBot on the floor next to a filing cabinet in the
office. T pg. 820, ln. 12-19; Exhibits 57-61. There was evidence of blood found on
the floorboards under the carpeting and on the kitchen floor, in the kitchen sink
and surround, and on the floor of the laundry room. Exhibits 82-84, 87-88, 90-97,
100-106. There was also blood spatter on the legs of a living room chair, the living
room walls, and blinds. T pg. 936, ln. 2 - pg. 938, ln. 23; Exhibits 37-41, 85-86, 137.
There was one spot of Otis’s blood on the living room ceiling. T pg. 1127, ln. 6-13;
Exhibit 150. Again, the DNA expert could not determine the age of the blood stains.
T pg. 1228, ln. 21-23.
Tom Bevel, a blood spatter expert, testified that the spatter pattern in the
garage was inconsistent with a fall from a ladder and consistent with a homicide.
T pg. 1300, ln. 12 - pg. 1301, ln. 13. Mr. Bevel testified that the blood evidence
found in the house, including the small drop of blood on the ceiling, suggested that
Otis was struck twice in the living room, where he bled profusely on the carpet, and
was then dragged through the kitchen and into the garage, where he was struck a
third time. T pg. 1321, ln. 3 - pg. 1323, ln. 4. Mr. Bevel testified that the blood drop
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of the ceiling was “castoff” from the hammer after it struck Otis. T pg. 1314, ln. 2025. Photographs taken from the garage indicate that Otis moved or was moved
once he was on the floor. Exhibits 4-7.
Dr. William Smock, M.D., testified that there were at least three separate
head wounds, all of which could have been caused by the hammer, and that Otis
died from those wounds. T pg. 1574, ln. 9 - pg. 1576, ln 17; pg. 1580, ln. 18-24.
There was a great deal of testimony about Tony being in financial difficulties
and how he may have stolen money from Otis by forging checks. The state’s theory
was that Tony decided to kill Otis to get money because Otis was not going to lend
him any more money. The jury rejected the state’s premeditation theory because it
acquitted Tony of first-degree murder. R 1591. The jury did not reach a verdict on
either the grand theft or forgery charges. R 1592, 1593.
On January 12, 2012, ten days after Otis’s death, while the police were
searching his house, Tony was at the Busted Shovel Bar and Grill in Meridian, but
was being watched by the police. After drinking about six beers, Tony left the bar.
He was stopped by the police and asked to wait until Detectives Joe Miller and
McGilvery arrived. T pg. 1926, ln. 23 -1930, ln. 17. Tony voluntarily went to the
police station where he was held and questioned over a four-hour period. He did not
make any admissions about harming his father, despite the detectives’ use of Reid
method interrogation techniques. T pg. 1935, ln. 10-25; see T pg. 1936 - pg. 1943.
Tony did tell the detectives that he left the house on January 2, at about 3:00, went
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to the Meridian Post Office, and then to the Idaho Athletic Club, and then went to
Ling & Louie’s restaurant. T pg. 1919, ln. 5-13. The gym’s member check-in history
does not show Tony being there on that day. Exhibit 118. However, another
member of the club testified that members can enter without checking in. T pg.
2158, ln. 23. Also, cell phone records show calls using a cell tower nearer his home
than the tower nearer the gym during that period. T pg. 1747, ln. 12-19. Tony did
not mention going to the bank to the police. T pg. 1884, ln. 7-15.
Tony testified that Otis came to live with him and his wife, Penny, in 2005. T
pg. 2351, ln. 15-21. Penny died of colon cancer in 2007 and Otis and Tony continued
living together. On January 2, 2012, he left the house in the mid to late afternoon,
and went to the Post Office. T pg. 2483, ln. 3-23. He deposited the check Otis had
written him for the carpet at 5:10 p.m. T pg. 2485, ln. 14-20. He then went to the
gym and after his workout he went to Ling & Louie’s for dinner. After dinner, he
went home and found his father in the garage. T pg. 2486, ln. 23 - pg. 2493, ln. 3.
Tony’s girlfriend, Anita Facer, testified she met Tony, Tony’s stepdaughter,
Kristin, and step-granddaughter, Scarlet, at Ling & Louie’s at about 7:00 p.m. T
pg. 1897, ln. 4-12. Dinner ended around 8:30. T pg. 1899, ln. 3-6. She did not
notice anything out of the ordinary about Tony’s demeanor at dinner. T pg. 1905, ln.
20- pg. 1906, ln. 14. She described Tony to the police as a “kind and giving person.”
T pg. 1908, ln. 7-10. Tony’s stepdaughter also did not notice anything different
about him at the restaurant. T pg. 2262, ln. 2-18. Kristin also testified that she
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had never seen Tony lose his temper with Otis. T pg. 2264, ln. 2.
Kristin was just one of many witnesses who testified to the caring
relationship Tony had with Otis. Carlos Lopez said Tony had a very close
relationship with Otis. Tony cared and looked after Otis and he had never seen
Tony angry with Otis. T pg. 2298, ln. 7-21. Kelly Riggs, a friend, said they had a
“caring relationship.” T pg. 2306, ln. 23-24. Paula Riggs described Tony as “very
kind and lovable and a big teddy bear.” She has known Tony for 45 years and had
never seen him angry. T pg. 2314, ln. 16-24. Tony was very close with his father.
He would bring Otis to her house for Thanksgiving or when Tony would just take
Otis out for a drive. T pg. 2317, ln. 19-25. On one occasion, Otis could not make it
to a Thanksgiving dinner, Tony felt uncomfortable leaving his father alone so he left
early and took a plate of food home for Otis. T pg. 2318, ln. 3-11.
Lynn Jeffers has known Tony for 30 years. She said that Tony is honest and
generous, the kind of friend who would come running to help even if you called at
2:00 a.m. T pg. 2175, ln. 1-14. Otis and Tony would come to her house for
Christmas dinner. She had never seen “Tony be anything other than gracious and
respectful of his dad.” T pg. 2177, ln. 3-8. Jeremy Jeffers said that “[i]t was very
obvious that Otis was No. 1 priority to Tony’s life.” T pg. 2190, ln. 9-11. Ed Bate
has known Tony for 33 years. He observed that they had a “[r]eal good father and
son relationship” and that he had never heard Tony say a bad word or complain
about Otis. T pg. 2241, ln. 1-12. Pamela Geile has known Tony for 50 years. T pg.
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2267, ln. 17-20. She said Tony and Otis had a great relationship and that Tony
treated Otis with respect and humor and tolerance. T pg. 2272, ln. 17-24.
The jury started its deliberations on April, 13, 2015, at 1:40 p.m., and
returned with a verdict on April 16, 2015, at 3:01 p.m. R 1552-1556. The jury
acquitted Tony of first-degree murder, but convicted him of second-degree murder
and of destruction, alteration or concealment of evidence. It could not reach a
verdict on either the grand theft or forgery count. R 1591-1591.
Tony was sentenced to 30 years for second-degree murder with 18 years
fixed, a de facto life sentence given Tony was 62 years old at sentencing, and a
concurrent term of five years on the alteration of evidence charge. R 1604-1605. A
timely notice of appeal was filed. R 1608.
III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
A. Did the court abuse its discretion when it excluded Otis Conner’s
statement made a week before his death that he had fallen down in the living room,
hurt his head, and bled on the carpet as inadmissible hearsay?
B. Did the court commit fundamental error by violating Tony Conner’s
constitutional right to present evidence in support of his defense when it excluded
that evidence?
IV. ARGUMENT
A. The district court abused its discretion by excluding Otis Conner’s
statement that he had injured himself as inadmissible hearsay. It was
admissible under the residue hearsay exception.
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1. Facts pertaining to argument
Prior to trial, Tony filed a Defendant’s Motion to Admit Certain Statements
Made by Otis Conner. R 1036. He sought to admit statements made by Otis to
Kelly Riggs in the week prior to his death, specifically:
Otis Conner was visited by Kelly and Paula Riggs on or about
December 29-30, 2012. During that visit when asked, Otis Conner
stated that he had “tripped over the dog, fell down and hit his head.”
Additionally, Otis stated “he was on the ground for awhile” and had
“lost a lot of blood.” Further, Otis stated that he “attempted to clean
up the blood, could not, and put a chair over the top of the blood stains
on the carpet.”
R 1036-37. Tony argued that the statements were relevant to his defense “and are
admissible under at least one of the recognized exceptions to the hearsay rule
contained in I.R.E. 803(3), 803(24), and 804(6).” R 1037.
Prior to trial, the court held a hearing on the motion. Tony argued the
statements were admissible under I.R.E. 803(3), as a statement of Otis’s then
existing physical condition. T pg. 100, ln. 10-20. The state argued the statements
were not trustworthy. T pg. 108, ln. 1-7. The court deferred ruling, stating that it
would “leave it to the parties to present the testimony at trial and make any
objections that the parties have at the time of trial.” Id., pg. 110, ln. 17-19.
At the trial, Kelly Riggs testified outside the presence of the jury. He and
family members went to the Conner house the week after Christmas of 2012 to
deliver a Christmas present to Tony. Mr. Riggs went to the door and spoke to Otis
because Tony wasn’t at home. After a while, Mr. Riggs’ wife and children joined
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them. Mr. Riggs stated:
We talked about several things. When my family come in, I noticed a
bandage on his head high on the right side by the hairline, a fairly
large bandage. I asked him what happened to his head. He said that
he got up out of the chair, lost his balance, fell down, hit his head, laid
there for a while, didn’t know how long. He didn’t know how long he
was on the floor. Got up, had bled on the carpet. Fixed his head and
then tried to clean the blood out of the carpet. Couldn’t. And so he slid
the chair over it, over the blood spot.
T pg. 2290, ln. 3-14. The state argued the evidence didn’t have circumstantial
guarantees of trustworthiness because it was different from what Mr. Riggs had
earlier told the police. According to the prosecutor, Mr. Riggs previously said that
he had only noticed a dog bite injury and that Ms. Riggs had said that she saw a
strip bandage. T pg. 2291, ln. 9-25. (Mr. Riggs later testified with the jury present.
He said he mentioned the dog bite and not the bandage because the police officers’
questions were focused on any injuries to Otis’s hand. T pg. 2311, ln. 2-11.)
2. The court’s ruling
The court ruled that the proffered testimony was hearsay and was not
admissible under I.R.E. 803(3). T pg. 2292, ln. 17-20. It also ruled it inadmissible
under the residual hearsay exception.
I do not find that it is admissible under 803(24) as the – what’s come to
be called the catchall exception. That originated from an old case
having to do with the use of old newspapers, but it is sparingly, if at
all, applied, and in part because there need to be some guarantee –
other circumstantial – well, as the State puts it, evidence of
trustworthiness. And we don’t have anything here that shows us
anymore trustworthiness than any statement made by a witness. The
problem is, as Mr. Bailey points out, the actual witness testifying isn’t
with us.
13

And so there is nothing particularly about the circumstances of that
conversation that would make its recitation through this witness
particularly trustworthy.
So I will not allow that conversation. You’re certainly entitled to
appeal and disagree.
T pg. 2292, ln. 24 - pg. 2293, ln. 16.
3. Why relief should be granted
The evidence was admissible under the residual hearsay exception. Idaho
Rule of Evidence 803(24) and 804(b)(6) both state:
A statement not specifically covered by any of the foregoing exceptions
but having the equivalent circumstantial guarantees of
trustworthiness, if the Court determines that (A) the statement is
offered as evidence of a material fact; (B) the statement is more
probative on the point for which it is offered than any other evidence
which the proponent can procure through reasonable efforts; and (C)
the general purpose of these rules and the interest of justice will be
best served by admission of the statement into evidence.
With Rule 803 the availability of the declarant as a witness is immaterial, Rule 804
requires the declarant to be unavailable. The decision whether to allow hearsay
evidence under Rule 803(24) is left to the exercise of the trial court’s discretion but
will be reversed on appeal upon a showing of an abuse of that discretion. State v.
Zimmerman, 121 Idaho 971, 974, 829 P.2d 861, 864 (1992). When a trial court's
discretionary decision is reviewed on appeal, the appellate court conducts a
multi-tiered inquiry to determine: (1) whether the lower court correctly perceived
the issue as one of discretion; (2) whether the lower court acted within the
boundaries of such discretion and consistently with any legal standards applicable
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to the specific choices before it; and (3) whether the court reached its decision by an
exercise of reason. State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333 (1989).
Here, the court abused its discretion because the exclusion of the evidence
was based upon its conclusion that the evidence was not particularly trustworthy.
T pg. 2293, ln. 11-14 (“And so there is nothing particularly about the circumstances
of that conversation that would make its recitation through this witness
particularly trustworthy.”) However, the rule only requires that statement have
“the equivalent circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness” as found in the
exceptions under 803 or 804. Evidence admitted under the residual exception need
not have extra-special trustworthiness but need only “demonstrate a
trustworthiness within the spirit of the specifically stated exceptions.” 2 McCormick
On Evid. § 324 (7th ed.), citing the Adv. Comm. Note, Fed. R. Evid. 803(24).
In fact, the hearsay rules allow much potentially untrustworthy evidence,
such as reputation evidence concerning personal or family history (I.R.E.
804(b)(4)),1 or a person’s character in the community (I.R.E. 803(22)),2 or hearsay

As noted by one commentator: “Such evidence, though multiple hearsay,
may be better than no evidence at all. This is a better justification for excepting it
from the hearsay rule than any claim to extraordinary trustworthiness.” Binder, et.
al., Hearsay Handbook 4th § 27:3
1

“Introduction of reputation evidence is an attempt to persuade the trier of
fact that something is true because a lot of people say so. Reputation evidence is
multiple hearsay. It is glorified gossip. How reliable is the gossip that you hear from
your family, friends, neighbors, and fellow employees?” Binder, et. al., Hearsay
Handbook 4th § 27:3.
2

15

concerning a land boundary (I.R.E. 803(20).3 Other hearsay exceptions in Rules 803
and 804 are also not particularly reliable, such an assertion of memory or belief
concerning a will (I.R.E. 803(3)),4 or certain records of religious organization (I.R.E.
803(11),5 or a dying declaration from a non-religious person or from someone
lacking lucidity due to the nearness of death.6 Thus, the trial court did not act
consistently with the legal standards required for admission of hearsay under the

“It is glorified gossip and is not extraordinarily trustworthy.” Binder, et. al.,
Hearsay Handbook 4th § 28:3.
3

“An assertion of memory or belief concerning the declarant’s will is not
particularly trustworthy. People often lie about their wills in order to placate or
avoid offending those whose expectations of favorable remembrance therein will be
disappointed.” Binder, et. al., Hearsay Handbook 4th § 14:3.
4

Assertions in religious records of services performed by religious officials,
and the dates thereof, are exceptionally trustworthy and merit exception from the
hearsay rule . . . . However, records kept by religious organizations of assertions of
paternity, etc., made by church members or others are not exceptionally
trustworthy. Logically, they do not merit exception from the hearsay rule.” Binder,
et. al., Hearsay Handbook 4th § 19:3.
5

“A dying declaration is a venerable exception to the hearsay rule. It is also
an irrational one. In the first place, dying declarations, on the whole, are not
exceptionally trustworthy. If the declarant is an atheist, or agnostic, or otherwise
unpersuaded about a relationship between honesty in this world and reward or
punishment in the next, the declarant's dying declaration should be no more
trustworthy than any other out-of-court assertion that the declarant might make.
6

True enough, if a man believes that hellfire and brimstone will follow should he die
with a lie on his lips, his dying declaration will likely represent what he believes to
be the truth. But this is far from a guarantee thereof. A dying man, in extremis,
may be less lucid than normal. Or his dying declaration may be based on suspicion,
not personal knowledge. Like Sherlock Holmes, he may be paranoid, and quick,
without proof, to attribute his ill fortune to an old enemy. ‘This is Moriarty's doing.’”
Binder, et. al., Hearsay Handbook 4th § 34:4.
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residual exception. No showing of particular trustworthiness is required and, in
fact, the level of trustworthiness of other evidence excepted from the hearsay rule is
low. The hearsay exceptions for many types of admittedly untrustworthy evidence
is driven more by tradition or necessary that reliability. Here, however the
statements were both reliable as other admissible hearsay as well as absolutely
necessary to the defense case.
While the state’s argument below focused on the reliability of Mr. Riggs’
testimony, “the proper focus of the Rule[‘s trustworthiness inquiry] is the reliability
of the declarant’s statement” as demonstrated by the inherent factors, e.g., those
factors connected with the making of the statement. Fed. Rules of Evidence
(Treatise) Rule 807 (3d ed.). The reliability of the witness who is relating the
statement can be explored upon cross-examination and is not the focus of the
trustworthiness inquiry. As noted by the Seventh Circuit, “the reliability of the
witness’ testimony that the hearsay statement was in fact made is not a factor to be
considered in deciding its admissibility.”
[T]he circumstantial guarantees of trustworthiness necessary under
the residual exception are to be “equivalent” to the guarantees that
justify the specific exceptions. Those guarantees relate solely to the
trustworthiness of the hearsay statement itself. 5 Wigmore, Supra, ss
1420, 1422. The specific exceptions to the hearsay rule are not justified
by any circumstantial guarantee that the witness who reports the
statement will do so accurately and truthfully. That witness can be
cross-examined and his credibility thus tested in the same way as that
of any other witness. It is the hearsay declarant, not the witness who
reports the hearsay, who cannot be cross-examined.
Huff v. White Motor Corp., 609 F.2d 286, 293 (7th Cir. 1979). Among the factors that
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have been identified in determining trustworthiness are: (1) the personal
characteristics of the declarant; (2) whether the declarant had personal knowledge
regarding the subject matter of the statement; (3) the clarity or ambiguity of the
statement; (4) the time lapse between the event and the making of the statement;
(5) the partiality of the declarant and the relationship between the declarant and
the witness; (6) the declarant’s motive to speak truthfully or untruthfully; (7) the
spontaneity of the statement, as opposed to responding to leading questions.
Here, both parties believed Otis was a competent witness. In fact, the state
introduced evidence of Otis’s out of court statements to Mr. Conner’s brother to
support its theory that Otis was not going to lend any more money to Mr. Conner.
T pg. 1995, ln. 7-19. Otis had personal knowledge regarding the subject matter of
the statement. His statements to Mr. Riggs were clear. There was only a short time
lapse between him falling down and the making of the statement. There was no
evidence presented at the proffer about the relationship between the declarant and
the witness. (During the trial Mr. Riggs testified that his family had a good
relationship with Otis. The Riggs children called him “Grandpa Otis.” T pg. 2305,
ln. 1-23. Paula Riggs testified that Otis would be invited to the Riggs’ home for
family gatherings, including Thanksgiving. T pg. 2316, ln. 22 - pg. 2318, ln. 15.)
Otis had no motive to speak untruthfully about the fall and the statement was not a
result of a leading question, but was a natural response to a question about the
bandage on his head. (The statement was also corroborated by Ms. Riggs who saw
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the bandage when she was helping Mr. Riggs deliver the Christmas present. T pg.
2319, ln. 6-16. Otis’s grandson and neighbors testified at trial that Otis was
unstable on his feet or that they had seen him fall. T pg. 2154, ln. 8-17; pg. 2163,
ln. 21- pg. 2165, ln. 1; pg. 2332, ln. 2-10.)
In addition to being sufficiently reliable, the other requirements of 803(24)
and 804(b)(6) are present. First, the statement was offered as evidence of a
material fact. The question of how Otis’s blood came to be in the living room was
central to the case. Its presence was, in the state’s view, strong evidence that Otis
was killed there and not in the garage. Evidence that there was another
explanation for the blood’s presence would have supported the defense’s accident
theory. The statement is more probative on the point for which it is offered than
any other evidence that Tony could present because he was not present when Otis
fell and no one else could testify to how Otis came to be injured or the extent of the
injury. Finally, the general purpose of these rules and the interest of justice will be
best served by admission of the statement into evidence. The jury was entitled to
hear all the competent evidence on this issue before it made a decision of such
importance.
In light of the above, this Court should find the trial court abused its
discretion in excluding this evidence. As this was objected-to error, the state bears
the burden of proving harmless error. State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 222, 245 P.3d
961, 974 (2010) (“Perry 2010”) (“A defendant appealing from an objected-to, non-
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constitutionally-based error shall have the duty to establish that such an error
occurred, at which point the State shall have the burden of demonstrating that the
error is harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.”).
B. Alternatively, the district court committed fundamental error by
violating Mr. Conner’s constitutional right to present evidence when it
excluded Otis Conner’s statements about his injury.
Mr. Conner’s argument below was that the evidence of Otis’s statements
were admissible under exceptions to the hearsay rule. But even if the evidence
were inadmissible under the residual hearsay clause, the trial court committed
fundamental constitutional error in excluding the evidence because it violated
Tony’s right to present evidence. However, since the constitutional basis for the
admission of the evidence was not argued below, this Court will review the claim
under Idaho’s fundamental error doctrine.
Such review includes a three-prong inquiry wherein the defendant
bears the burden of persuading the appellate court that the alleged
error: (1) violates one or more of the defendant's unwaived
constitutional rights; (2) plainly exists (without the need for any
additional information not contained in the appellate record, including
information as to whether the failure to object was a tactical decision);
and (3) was not harmless. If the defendant persuades the appellate
court that the complained of error satisfies this three-prong inquiry,
then the appellate court shall vacate and remand.
Perry 2010, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980. Each of these inquiries are met here.
1. One of Mr. Conner’s unwaived constitutional rights was violated.
A defendant in a criminal case has a constitutional right to present a defense,
including the right to present the defendant’s version of the facts. State v. Thomas,
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157 Idaho 916, 342 P.3d 628, 631 (2015). The right to present evidence is grounded
in the Sixth Amendment’s Compulsory Process Clause. Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S.
400, 409 (1988); State v. Harris, 132 Idaho 843, 846, 979 P.2d 1201, 1204 (1999).
“The right of an accused in a criminal trial to due process is, in essence, the right to
a fair opportunity to defend against the State’s accusations.” Chambers v.
Mississippi, 410 U.S. 284, 294 (1973). Few rights are more fundamental than that
of an accused to present witnesses in his own defense. Id. at 302. Thus, where the
application of rules of evidence deprives a criminal defendant of a fair opportunity
to defend against the charge, the conviction cannot stand. Id. at 302–03;
“Just as an accused has the right to confront the prosecution witnesses for
the purpose of challenging their testimony, he has the right to present his own
witnesses to establish a defense. This right is a fundamental element of due process
of law.” Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 22–23 (1967). In Washington, the
judgment of conviction was vacated because the excluded evidence was “relevant
and material, and ... vital to the defense.” Id. at 16, 87 S.Ct. 1920.
Since the right is fundamental, it is subject only to reasonable limitations.
State v. Perry, 139 Idaho 520, 523, 81 P.3d 1230, 1233 (2003) (“Perry 2003”), citing,
U.S. v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 308 (1998); see also Chambers v. Mississippi, 410
U.S. 284, 294 (1973). The exclusion of evidence does not impair the defendant’s
right “to present a defense so long as it is not “arbitrary” or “disproportionate” to
the purposes the exclusion serves. Scheffer, 523 U.S. at 308, quoting Rock v.
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Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 55 (1987). The exclusion is unconstitutionally arbitrary or
disproportionate when it has infringed upon a weighty interest of the accused. Id.;
Perry 2003, supra. In determining whether Sixth Amendment rights were violated
by the exclusion of evidence, this Court considers whether the evidence proffered is
relevant and then asks whether other legitimate interests outweighed the
defendant's interest in presenting the evidence. State v. Peite, 122 Idaho 809,
814–15, 839 P.2d 1223, 1228–29 (Ct. App.1992). While recognizing that trial judges
have broad discretion to determine whether prejudicial effect or other concerns
outweigh the probative value of the evidence, it will find a Sixth Amendment
violation when it finds that the trial court abused its discretion. Id. “Relevant
Evidence” means evidence having any tendency to make the existence of any fact
that is of consequence to the determination of the action more probable or less
probable than it would be without the evidence. State v. Thomas, 157 Idaho at 919,
342 P.3d at 631, quoting, I.R.E. 401. Whether evidence is relevant is an issue of
law, which is reviewed de novo. Id; State v. Russo, 157 Idaho 299, 308, 336 P.3d
232, 241 (2014).
In Perry 2003, the Court held that expert testimony regarding polygraph
testing, as well as the polygraph results, were inadmissible. It found that “Perry’s
constitutional right to present a defense will not be infringed upon by this Court’s
holding [because] Perry will be able to present all of the relevant details of the
charge from his perspective and will not be precluded from introducing factual
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evidence; the exclusion merely bars the introduction of expert opinion testimony
that would bolster Perry's credibility.” State v. Perry, 139 Idaho at 525, 81 P.3d at
1235. In Peite, the defendant in a rape case sought permission to introduce
evidence of the complaining witness’s past sexual behavior. The Court found that
evidence was not relevant to the question of whether she consented to the charged
intercourse and concluded there was no Sixth Amendment right to present the
evidence. Peite, 122 Idaho at 813, 839 P.2d at 1227.
However, in Thomas, the Court found that evidence that the decedent in a
murder case had previously engaged in erotic asphyxiation was improperly
excluded. The defendant testified that on about twenty previous occasions the
decedent had put a belt around her neck and tightened it when they were having
sex and had also used neckties. The defendant testified that on the day of her
death, they had intercourse and “that when he got up to dress, she continued to
masturbate with the belt around her neck, which was something she had done
before. He then left and sat in his vehicle for a while attempting to sleep. After a
little while, he went back into Decedent’s house and found her dead.” State v.
Thomas, 157 Idaho at 918, 342 P.3d at 630. “The district court held that evidence of
Decedent’s prior sexual acts involving autoerotic asphyxia were inadmissible if they
did not include the use of a rope, belt, tie, or other similar device.” Id. This had the
effect of excluding evidence including that the decedent told a female friend that she
liked to be “choked out” and that the defendant had done so, but only with his
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hands and a statement from the decedent’s boyfriend statement that while having
sex the decedent “brought his hand up to her neck, squeezed her hand around his
hand, and asked if he would squeeze her neck a little bit. . . . Later in their
relationship, they were having sex and she asked him if he would choke her.” State
v. Thomas, 157 Idaho at 917, 342 P.3d at 629. The Court found a Sixth Amendment
violation because the “excluded evidence would have corroborated Defendant’s
testimony that Decedent enjoyed erotic asphyxiation and was relevant to the issue
of whether he intentionally killed her. The fact that Decedent had only informed the
excluded witnesses about desiring to be asphyxiated by a sexual partner who used
his hands does not make the evidence irrelevant.” Thomas, 157 Idaho at 919, 342
P.3d at 631. Likewise here, the introduction of Otis’s statements would have
corroborated Tony’s testimony about Otis injuring himself, bleeding on the floor,
and attempting to clean the carpet with the SpotBot. It also would have
corroborated Tony’s testimony about how the heat register came to be cleaned, how
Otis’s blood ended up in the sink, and how there was Otis’s blood on the claw
hammer.
This case is similar to Thomas because evidence of an innocent reason for the
presence of Otis’s blood in the living room was central to the defense of accidental
fall in the garage, just as the evidence of erotic asphyxiation was an alternative
explanation for the presence of the defendant’s leather belt which was found
cinched tightly around the neck of his deceased wife. In both cases, the presence of
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highly suspicious evidence could be explained with the excluded evidence.
2. The error plainly exists and the failure to object on this basis was not a
tactical decision.
It is plain from the record that the trial court did not allow the presentation
of the proffered evidence. And the failure to raise the constitutional objection could
not have been a tactical decision on the part of trial counsel because they attempted
to gain the admission of the evidence by arguing it fit within an exception to the
hearsay rule. Thus, this prong of the Perry test has been met.
3. The error was not harmless
In fundamental error analysis the defendant bears the burden of proving
there is a reasonable possibility that the unobjected-to unwaived constitutional
error affected the outcome of the trial. Perry 2010, 150 Idaho at 226, 245 P.3d at
978. Here, that burden can be met.
First, it is important to note that the jury deliberated for four days before
returning a verdict on the lesser-included offense of second-degree murder and
failing to reach verdicts on the grand-theft and forgery counts. While there are no
Idaho cases specifically considering length of deliberation, other appellate courts
have considered the jury’s behavior and length of jury deliberations. United States
v. Sandoval–Gonzalez, 642 F.3d 717, 726 (9th Cir. 2011) (stating that lengthy jury
deliberations suggest a difficult case and weigh against a finding of harmless error);
United States v. Caruto, 532 F.3d 822, 832 (9th Cir. 2008) (finding that
circumstances surrounding the jury’s deliberation demonstrated the error was not
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harmless); United States v. Varoudakis, 233 F.3d 113, 126 (1st Cir. 2000) (holding
that lengthy deliberations suggest a difficult case and that the three-day length of
the jury deliberations, along with the jury’s note to the trial court that it was “at an
impasse” at the end of the second half-day, weighed against a finding of harmless
error); Rhoden v. Rowland, 172 F.3d 633, 637 (9th Cir.1999) (determining that the
disputed evidence accompanied with the nine hours of deliberation over three days
suggested that the jury did not find the case to be clear cut); Gibson v. Clanon, 633
F.2d 851, 855 n. 8 (9th Cir. 1980) (stating that although the case presented was
strong, it did not seem possible that the jury would have deliberated for nine hours
over several days if the jurors did not have serious questions as to the credibility of
the eyewitnesses); Dallago v. United States, 427 F.2d 546, 559 (D.C.Cir. 1969) (“The
jury deliberated for five days, and one would expect that if the evidence of guilt was
overwhelming the jury would have succumbed much sooner.”); Allen v. United
States, 837 A.2d 917, 922 (D.C. 2003) (considering the length of the jury
deliberations and jury behavior in its harmless error analysis). Here the jury
deliberated for four days. It also acquitted Tony of the most serious charge and
could not reach a verdict on two other counts.
In addition, the state’s case had its weaknesses, starting with the first
responders and the coroner’s original assessment of the death as an accidental fall.
Otis had a history of doing things which were outside of his physical abilities and of
ignoring requests to slow down and ask for help. The evidence was overwhelming
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that Tony loved and respected his father, and that Tony was not an angry or violent
person. There was no reason for Tony to kill his father. The jury flatly rejected the
state’s theory of a financial motive, as shown by the acquittal of pre-meditated
murder, and the inability to reach a verdict on either theft count. Had the jury
heard from an independent witness that Otis said that he got up out of the chair,
lost his balance, fell down, hit his head, laid there for an unknown amount of time
bleeding on the carpet, then fixed his head and tried to clean the blood, it is more
likely than not the jury would have acquitted Tony of both the murder and
destruction of evidence charges.
V. CONCLUSION
For the reasons set forth above, Mr. Conner asks this Court to vacate the
judgment of conviction and remand the matter for a new trial.
Respectfully submitted this 24th day of May 2016.
/s/
Dennis Benjamin
Attorney for Anthony “Tony” Conner
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